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The current study presents a conceptual replication of Liang and Xue’s (2010) test of their proposed 
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT). Whereas the original study investigated individuals’ spyware 
related threat perceptions, avoidance motivations, and behaviors; we applied the original study’s research 
questions, hypotheses, and model to the more general context of malware. Results from a sample of 486 
computer users revealed that safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy are relatively robust 
predictors of avoidance motivation across varied settings. Perceived severity is a strong predictor of 
perceived threat, however the impact of this overall threat perception (along with its perceived susceptibility 
antecedent) may be less stable in predicting avoidance motivation under changing contextual/environmental 
circumstances. The results suggest that TTAT is a valid foundational framework for examining user behavior 
related to malicious software. Future research should investigate additional predictors of avoidance 
motivation such as risk propensity, distrust, and impulse control to improve the power of the model. 
Additionally, the current TTAT instrument offers several opportunities for enhanced measurement accuracy 
through item modifications, scale anchor revisions, and improvements in parsimony. 
Keywords: Technology Threat Avoidance Theory, Information Security, Malware, Susceptibility, Severity, 
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1 Introduction 
Research focused on understanding the antecedents of cyber security behaviors continues to draw attention 
in the Information Systems literature  (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Boss, Galletta, Benjamin Lowry, Moody, 
& Polak, 2015; Chatterjee, Sarker, & Valacich, 2015; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015). Such research 
is important as prior studies have shown that insecure behaviors often contribute to security events (Sasse, 
Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001; Stantona, Stama, Mastrangelo, & Joiton, 2005; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 
2008). Accordingly, understanding the factors that influence individuals’ security related behaviors may lead 
to technologies, policies, and procedures that effectively encourage individuals to behave more securely.  
Liang and Xue (2010) proposed the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) to explain individuals’ 
cyber security behaviors in terms of motivation to avoid threats. The theory argues that individuals weigh 
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their susceptibility to and the severity of cyber threats against the effort necessary to implement safeguards 
in order to avoid the threats. The result of this calculus is a level of motivation needed to enact avoidance 
behaviors. A subsequent test of the theory in the context of anti-spyware software usage provided support 
for most of the theory’s key proposals (Liang & Xue, 2010).   
In the current study, we followed the conceptual replication definition found in Dennis and Valacich (2014) 
and replicated Liang and Xue’s (2010) study using the same research questions and hypotheses, slightly 
modified wording of measures, with a larger, more diverse sample of respondents.  Accordingly, this paper 
makes several contributions to theory and practice. In terms of theory, the original study focused on 
individuals’ spyware related threat perceptions and use of anti-spyware software to mitigate those threats. 
We altered the context of our study to focus on malware threat perceptions and use of anti-malware software 
to avoid such threats. We feel this is an important contribution, as spyware is just one of many types of 
malware that users must take actions to avoid. Today many anti-malware products protect against 
numerous types of security threats including spyware. Accordingly, testing the theory in this broader context 
provides support for applying the theory to more general threat avoidance technologies and processes.  
Our results also support use of the theory to explain cyber security motivations and behaviors for a broad 
range of individuals. We included students from three institutions in our sample frame: one large public, 
research-oriented university with well-regarded cyber security programs; one large, public, doctoral granting 
higher research university; and one small, private Liberal Arts university. By including students from 
institutions with varied academic profiles, we broadened the diversity of the respondents and reduced the 
possibility of institution-based biases influencing our results. Additionally, our sample contained 486 usable 
responses, which provided a dataset large enough to detect even relatively small effect sizes (Cohen, 1992).  
Finally, in terms of practice, our findings indicate that attempts to encourage more secure behavior should 
focus on: 1) emphasizing the effectiveness of threat avoidance safeguards, 2) nurturing individuals’ beliefs 
regarding their ability to implement and use threat safeguards and 3) reducing individuals’ perceptions 
concerning the level of effort needed to implement threat safeguards. Cyber security technology vendors 
and policy writers can use these findings to develop products, processes, and messages that effectively 
encourage more secure behavior. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin with a short review of Liang and Xue’s (2010) 
TTAT research model and hypotheses. We then describe our research method, data collection, and analysis 
processes, followed by a comparison of our results to Liang and Xue’s (2010) results. Finally, we close with 
a discussion of the implications resulting from our study and suggestions for future research. 
2 Research Model and Hypotheses 
Drawing on Cybernetic and Coping theories, Liang and Xue (2009) proposed Technology Threat Avoidance 
Theory to explain users’ cyber security motivations in terms of threat perceptions and coping ability. The 
theory posits that in a given context, an individuals’ threat perception is formed based on their views 
regarding the severity associated with a given cyber threat and their own susceptibility to that threat. 
Individuals then appraise their ability to cope with a given threat based on: 1) how effective they believe a 
given safeguard is at helping them avoid the threat, 2) the overall effort cost of implementing the avoidance 
safeguard, and 3) their ability to implement the safeguard. The output of this appraisal process is a specific 
level of avoidance motivation which, in turn, influences the individual’s decision to engage in behavior 
specifically intended to help them avoid the threat.  
Liang and Xue (2010) tested their proposed theory in the context of anti-spyware software used to detect 
the presence of covert monitoring applications on a computer. A survey instrument was developed by 
incorporating or adapting items from pre-existing instruments for some constructs with new item 
development for others. The initial set of items was vetted by a focus group though face-to-face interviews. 
The survey was then administered to 152 business students at a major US university. SmartPLS 2.0 was 
used to validate the instrument and test the nine hypotheses (Table 1). Support was found for all hypotheses 
except an interactive effect of perceived severity and perceived susceptibility on threat perceptions (H1c). 
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Table 1:  Liang and Xue's (2010) Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis Result 
H1a Perceived susceptibility of being attacked by malicious IT positively affects perceived threat. Supported 
H1b Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious IT positively affects perceived threat. Supported 




H2 Perceived threat positively affects avoidance motivation. Supported 
H3 Safeguard effectiveness positively affects avoidance motivation. Supported 
H3a Perceived threat and safeguard effectiveness have a negative interaction effect on avoidance 
motivation. 
Supported 
H4 Safeguard cost negatively affects avoidance motivation. Supported 
H5 Self-efficacy positively affects avoidance motivation. Supported 
H6 Avoidance motivation positively affects the avoidance behavior of using the safeguard. Supported 
 
 
Figure 1:  Technology Threat Avoidance Model reproduced from Liang and Xue (2010) 
There have been several important considerations of Technology Threat Avoidance Theory since Liang and 
Xue first tested their theory. Arachchilage and Love (2013) incorporated TTAT in their examination of game 
based education as a safeguard against phishing attacks.  Their results indicate support for TTAT and even 
found significant results for the interaction between Perceived Severity and Perceived Susceptibility where 
Liang and Xue (2010) found no significance.  Subsequently, Arachchilage and Love (2014) modified TTAT 
to study the effects of Procedural Knowledge and Conceptual Knowledge as antecedents to Self-Efficacy 
excluding threat appraisal and other portions of the coping appraisal as conceived in TTAT.  While results 
were significant, the R2 value for Avoidance Motivation was .29 and Avoidance Behavior was .33.  This 
reduction in explanatory power indicates further work is needed in determining antecedents to the 
Avoidance Behavior construct.  
In a coping perspective study by Lai, Li and Hsieh (2012), a modified TTAT model was incorporated.  This 
work looked at identity theft and the effects of Conventional Coping and Technological Coping on an 
individual’s avoidance behaviors. While this work found significance for these constructs, factor loadings for 
Identity Theft Avoidance Behavior were low (.21 to .61) and the AVE for Conventional Coping and 
Technological Coping were also low (.54 and .66).  It is important to note that Lai et al (2012) did also test 
Social Influence as an antecedent to coping and this construct demonstrated good reliability and validity. 
Finally, Herath et al. (2014) consolidated Technology Acceptance, Technology Threat Avoidance and 
Protection Motivation Theories to explore how threat appraisal, internal coping mechanism appraisal, 
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external coping mechanism appraisal influence coping motivation.  Results indicate significant effects for 
email authentication service as a coping mechanism to deal with email threats. 
Though the application of TTAT across these studies varied in context and conceptualization, all 
demonstrate the value of Technology Threat Avoidance Theory as a tool for exploring threat appraisal, 
coping mechanisms and threat avoidance behavior.  Because of the inconsistent results when using 
modified models, we chose to test the original Liang and Xue’s (2010) TTAT research model and 
hypotheses in our replication study. The following section outlines the details of our research method.  
3 Methodology 
We used an online survey instrument to collect data for the replication study. The instrument contained five 
blocks of indicators to assess the latent constructs included in the TTAT model. The first block of indicators 
measured beliefs regarding malware susceptibility as well as beliefs concerning the severity of the 
consequences resulting from a malware breach. The second block of indicators assessed beliefs 
concerning:  1) the level of threat associated with a malware breach, 2) the effectiveness of anti-malware 
software at protecting against such breaches, and 3) the effort cost associated with implementing and using 
an anti-malware application. The third block of indicators measured self-efficacy or the user’s perception of 
their ability to effectively install and use anti-malware software. The fourth block of indicators assessed 
individuals’ motivation to avoid malware breaches and their self-reported behavior toward that objective. 
The survey concluded with several demographic questions. Within blocks, all indicators were randomized 
to protect against ordering effects (Shadish, Cook, & Campbel, 2002). 
Business students at three universities were invited to participate in the study. We used business students 
as surrogates for the more general population of technology users. Consistent with the recommendations 
of Compeau et al. (2012), we note that while most business students are avid technology users, it is 
important to acknowledge that they are typically younger and more technologically savvy than the population 
as a whole. Additionally, we note that this is a purposeful replication of a previous study that used students 
as its sample, so the use of consistent samples enhances the comparability of the findings between the 
studies.  
At a large, public university, 60 students in an upper-division undergraduate Health Information 
Management course were asked to participate with no incentives offered for participation. Forty-five 
students completed the survey for a 75% response rate. At a small, private Liberal Arts university, students 
in 15 upper-division undergraduate business courses with a total enrollment of 393 students were asked to 
participate in exchange for nominal extra credit points. Some students were enrolled in two or more of the 
classes included in the sample frame. Those students were allowed to collect extra credit points in multiple 
classes but were instructed to only complete the survey a single time. One hundred ninety-six (196) of the 
invited students completed the survey. Internal Review Board anonymity requirements precluded tracking 
the identities of the responding students. Accordingly, we cannot calculate an exact response rate, but 
provide a highly conservative estimate of 49.8% (196 responses / 393 total students enrolled in the 15 
classes) for this institution. We used 393 as the denominator in our response rate calculation as it assumes 
the largest potential subject pool with no duplicate enrollments and thus provides the lowest potential 
response rate. Finally, 471 students in two sections of a freshman-level undergraduate business course at 
a large, public research-oriented university were invited to participate in exchange for nominal extra credit 
points. Two hundred seventy-one (271) of those student completed the survey for a response rate of 57.5%.  
Table 2 provides a demographic comparison of the Liang and Xue’s (2010) sample and the samples we 
collected from the three universities.  Respondents in our samples included students majoring in business, 
health information management, and undeclared majors.  The original sample used by the Liang and Xue 
(2010) sample included only business majors.  The Sample A respondents were similar in age and gender 
to the Liang and Xue respondents.  In contrast, the Sample B respondents were younger, while the Sample 
C respondents were considerable older.  A key difference between the three samples we collected was life 
state of the respondents.  The Sample B respondents were mostly unmarried, childless, and did not work 
full-time.  In contrast, 10% of the Sample A respondents were married and had children and 25% worked 
full-time.  Finally, nearly half of the Sample C respondents worked full time, while a significant number were 
married and had children. 
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Table 2:  Sample Demographics 
Characteristic 
Liang & Xue 
(2010) Sample Sample A Sample B Sample C 
Size 













Business Business and 
Undeclared Majors 
Business Majors Health Information 
Management Majors 




Mean Age 23 22 20 31 









Gender Split 66% male 57% Male 59% Male 15% Male 
Married Unknown  9% 3.50% 40% 
Have Children Unknown  10% 3% 36% 
Work Full Time Unknown  25% 3.50% 44% 
During the analysis phase of the project, the three samples were combined and 26 invalid or incomplete 
responses were identified. Accordingly, these responses were eliminated from the merged sample, leaving 
486 complete and usable responses for analysis. Of the remaining responses in the merged sample, the 
average respondent age was 22.3 (SD = 5.33) and 54.4% were male. In terms of race, 8% of respondents 
identified as Black or African American, 13% as Asian, 37% as Hispanic, 2% as Native American, and 41% 
as White. Slightly less than 10% of respondents identified as married, 10% had children, and 18.3% 
indicated that they worked full-time.  
3.1 Measurement of Constructs 
Measures for the study were drawn from Liang and Xue (2010). All indicators were modified to fit the 
malware context. Wording of some indicators was revised slightly to improve clarity. Additionally, two of the 
original perceived susceptibility indicators were merged into a single indicator as their wording was nearly 
identical except that one focused on present perceptions of threat susceptibility and one focused on 
perceptions of future threat susceptibility. We felt that it was inappropriate to include perceptions of future 
susceptibility in an assessment of current avoidance motivation and behavior because no time frame was 
specified between this future susceptibility and the associated avoidance motivation or behavior actions. 
For example, a subject perceiving that her threat susceptibility might be great five years from now will likely 
not be motivated to take any action to avoid that threat now. Appendix A provides a comparison of the 
indicators used in the current study and the original Liang and Xue indicators.   
Scale anchors for the perceived severity indicators were modified from the seven-point sematic differential 
descriptors used by Liang and Xue to seven-point Likert scale descriptors consistent with other scales on 
the instrument. Additionally, indicators to measure self-efficacy were rescaled from a ten-point Likert scale 
to a seven-point Likert scale. We made these changes so that all indicators were consistently measured 
using a seven-point Likert scale that was anchored in ascending order with the phrases strongly disagree, 
disagree, somewhat disagree, neutral, somewhat agree, agree, strongly agree. The final instrument 
contained four indicators to assess perceived susceptibility, ten indicators to assess perceived severity, five 
indicators to assess perceived threat, six indicators to assess perceived safeguard effectiveness, three 
indicators to assess safeguard cost, ten indicators to assess self-efficacy, two indicators to assess 
avoidance motivation, and two indicators to assess avoidance behavior. 
4 Data Analysis and Results 
The collected data were analyzed using the R language statistics package PLSPM, a Partial Least Squares 
(PLS) approach for studying the linear relationships that exist between blocks of latent variables. PLS is a 
powerful method for analyzing complex models that contain related latent constructs. Additionally, the 
method has been shown to work well with both interval and ratio scales while making minimal demands on 
sample size and residual distributions (Chin, 1998). 
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4.1 Measurement Validation 
We began the analysis process by first standardizing all data values.  Next, we modeled all items as 
reflective indicators of the hypothesized latent constructs (Sanchez, 2013) and assessed the convergent 
and discriminate validity of the TTAT model using two procedures. First, for each indicator, the exploratory 
factor analysis loadings were inspected to ensure that they were higher for the hypothesized construct than 
all other latent constructs. Next, for each indicator, the square root of the average variance extract (AVE) 
was checked to ensure that it was higher than the construct’s correlations with any other construct (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981). Initial results indicated that a small number of individual items loaded poorly on their 
hypothesized constructs.  These included a single perceived severity indicator SEV7, as well as self-efficacy 
indicators SLF1, SLF2, SLF3, and SLF8. Both the perceived severity scale and the self-efficacy scale had 
large item pools and thus provided high internal consistency and high scale reliability without the poorly 
loading items. Accordingly, those indicators were removed from the model and the analysis was re-run.  
Subsequent results provided support for the convergent and discriminate validity of the measurement 
model. As can be seen in Appendix B, all indicators loaded higher on their hypothesized constructs than on 
all other constructs. Additionally, each construct’s square root of AVE was higher than its correlation with 
all other constructs as can be seen in Table 3. Next, to ensure the measures were reliable as well as valid, 
we calculated the composite reliability of each latent construct. All reliability coefficients exceeded the 
recommended .70 threshold suggested by Nunnally (1978) indicating an acceptable level of reliability also 
existed in the measurement model.  
 
Table 3:  Correlation matrix and AVEs for constructs 
Constructs R AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Perceived Susceptibility .936 .702 .838        
Perceived Severity .860 .662 .389  .814       
Perceived Threat .836 .603 .285  .618  .777      
Safeguard Effectiveness .915 .701 .191  .585  .661  .837     
Safeguard Cost .881 .807 .105 -.198 -.071 -.207  .898    
Self-efficacy .875 .609 .136  .324  .268  .336 -.059 .780   
Avoidance Motivation .908 .854 .127  .376  .368  .494 -.378 .256 .924  
Avoidance Behavior .854 .872 .023  .272  .244  .370 -.308 .195 .753 .934 
Note:  The diagonal elements represent square roots of AVE 
We followed the Liang and Xue (2010) methods for testing for the presence of common method variance. 
Since the publication of the original test of TTAT, the first method, Harman’s (1976) single factor test has 
been criticized as not being a sufficiently robust procedure for detecting common method bias (Chin, 
Thatcher, & Wright, 2012; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012; Sharma, Yetton, & Crawford, 2009); 
however, we felt that to be true to Liang and Xue’s work we should perform the test in the same manner. 
Therefore, we used two techniques to test for the presence of common method variance in our collected 
data. First, we conducted Harman’s (1976) single factor test, which calls for factor analyzing all indicators 
and constraining the results to a single factor, un-rotated solution. If the resulting factor accounts for more 
than 50% of the variance in the data, large common method variance could be present in the data. The test 
revealed that a single-factor solution only accounted for 29% of the variance in the data. Further, inspection 
of both eigenvalues and the scree plot resulting from an unconstrained factor solution indicated that eight 
distinct factors existed and accounted for 68% of the variance in the data. Accordingly, the Harman test did 
not indicate that common method variance was of concern for the replication data.   
Next, we applied Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) unmeasured latent method factor technique, which calls for 
comparing the results of the hypothesized factor model to the results of a revised model that includes a 
common method latent construct. In the revised model, all indicators are modeled to load on both their 
theorized construct and the common method construct. Accordingly, the revised model partitions each 
indicator’s variance into three components representing the hypothesized construct, the method construct, 
and error. To conduct this test, we used AMOS to estimate a confirmatory factor analysis model that included 
only the hypothesized latent constructs and their reflective indicators. The results of that model were 
compared to the estimate of an updated model that included a common method latent construct. 
Standardized regression weights and Chi squared values for the two models were compared. No significant 
differences were found suggesting that common method variance was unlikely to be of concern for our data. 
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4.2 TTAT Model Testing 
Figure 2 shows that for the replication study, the TTAT model accounted for 39% of the variance in perceived 
threat, 34% of the variance in avoidance motivation, and 57% of the variance in avoidance behavior. 
Compared to the original study, the replication data provided a six percent increase in explanatory value for 
perceived threat (R2 = .39 compared to R2 = .33), a 22% decrease in explanatory value for avoidance 
motivation (R2 = .34 compared to R2 = .56), and a 36% increase in explanatory value for avoidance behavior 
(R2 = .57 compared to R2 = .21).  
In the replication study, the influence of perceived severity on perceived threat was significant (β = .59, p < 
.001) providing strong support for H1b. However, neither perceived susceptibility nor the interactive effect 
of perceived severity and perceived susceptibility were found to be significantly related to perceived threat 
in the replication study. Accordingly, neither H1a nor H1c were supported.  
Figure 2:  TTAT Model Replication Results 
While Liang and Xue (2010) report similar findings in regards to the interaction term, they did find a 
significant association between perceived susceptibility and perceived threat (β = .41 p < .01). In fact, for 
the original study respondents, the influence of perceived susceptibility on perceived threat was greater 
than the influence of perceived severity (β = .41 compared to β = .27) on perceived threat. In the replication 
study, the influence of perceived susceptibility was both weak and non-significant (β = .05, p = .24) while 
the influence of perceived severity was strong and highly significant (β = .59, p < .001). Accordingly, the 
Liang and Xue (2010) respondents associated their susceptibility to spyware as more threatening than the 
replication study respondents associated their susceptibility to malware. In addition, the TTAT respondents’ 
threat perceptions were more heavily influenced by their susceptibility to spyware than by the severity of the 
consequences resulting from a spyware inflection. In comparison, the replication study respondents did not 
associate a high level of threat with their susceptibility to a malware breach but did consider the severity of 
the consequences resulting from a malware breach to be highly threatening.  
In regard to the antecedents of avoidance motivation, in the replication study, the influence of perceived 
threat on avoidance motivation was relatively small and marginally significant (β = .10, p = .058) providing 
weak support for H2. This finding is quite different from the moderately sized, significant influence found for 
perceived threat on avoidance motivation in the original study (β = .26, p < .01). In addition, the interactive 
effect of perceived threat and safeguard effectiveness on avoidance motivation was not significant in the 
replication study. Accordingly, support was not found for H3a. This deviates from the results of the original 
study in which the interaction term was found to be both significantly and negatively associated with 

















(- .02) = .71
(.05) = .24 (- .02) = .67 (.75) < .001
R2 = .34
(.33) < .001





Note:  (β) ρ value
Interaction
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the relatively high threat perceptions (mean = 5.5, variance = 1.09, standard deviation = 1.04) and safeguard 
effectiveness perceptions (mean = 5.6, variance = 1.02, standard deviation = 1.01) reported by our 
respondents on the 7 point Likert scale instrument. Mean and dispersion characteristics were not reported 
in the original study so we cannot compare them directly. However, we posit that the high means and 
relatively low dispersion for both variables in our study may make it difficult to detect the hypothesized 
interaction effect. We also note that the original Liang and Xue (2010) study only found a small to medium 
size effect of the interaction term which could further exacerbate any issues associated with low dispersion 
characteristics in our sample.   
Replication results concerning safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy were very similar 
to those found in the original study, providing strong support for H3, H4, and H5. In the replication study, 
safeguard effectiveness was found to significantly and positively influence avoidance motivation (β = .33, p 
< .001), which is very close to the results reported (β = .33, p < .01) in the original study. Safeguard cost 
was found to significantly and negatively influence avoidance motivation (β = -.30, p < .001), a stronger and 
more significant result than was found in the original study (β = -.14, p < .05). Finally, self-efficacy was found 
to significantly and positively influence avoidance motivation (β = .10, p < .001).  This is similar to Liang and 
Xue’s results (β = .19, p < .05), however, we caution against comparing the two study's beta coefficients for 
this variable as the measurement scale was changed for the replication study from a 10 point sematic 
differential to a 7 point Likert scale.  
As neither of the interaction terms hypothesized in TTAT were significant when tested with the replication 
data, we removed them from the model to see if the change improved the significance of the perceived 
threat on avoidance motivation association.  
Figure 3 shows the results of the test. With the interaction terms removed, perceived threat had a modest 
significant effect on avoidance motivation (β = .10, p = .05), while the relationship was nominally weaker (β 
= .10, p = .06) with the interaction term included. Thus we conclude that neither of the interaction terms 




Figure 3:  TTAT Model Replication Results - Interaction Terms Removed 
Our replication results provide strong support for a significant association between avoidance motivation 
and avoidance behavior (β =.75, p < .001), which is similar to the results reported by Liang and Xue (2010)  
(β = .43, p < .05). Accordingly, support was found for H6. Table 4 summarizes our hypotheses results and 
compares our findings to those reported in TTAT.  
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Table 4:  Hypotheses Results and Comparison 
Hypothesis Text Replication 
Results 
Liang & Xue 
(2010) Results 
H1a Perceived susceptibility of being attacked by malicious IT 
positively affects perceived threat. 
Not Supported Supported 
H1b Perceived severity of being attacked by malicious IT 
positively affects perceived threat. 
Supported Supported 
H1c Perceived susceptibility and perceived severity have a 
positive interaction effect on perceived threat. 
Not Supported Not  
Supported 
H2 Perceived threat positively affects avoidance motivation. Supported Supported 
H3 Safeguard effectiveness positively affects avoidance 
motivation 
Supported Supported 
H3a Perceived threat and safeguard effectiveness have a 
negative interaction effect on avoidance motivation. 
Not Supported Supported 
H4 Safeguard cost negatively affects avoidance motivation. Supported Supported 
H5 Self-efficacy positively affects avoidance motivation. Supported Supported 
H6 Avoidance motivation positively affects the avoidance 
behavior of using the safeguard. 
Supported Supported 
5 Discussion 
While our findings largely mirrored those reported by Liang and Xue (2010), there were a few notable 
differences. First, perceived susceptibility was not a significant predictor of perceived threat. This contrary 
finding may be due to the increasing proliferation of malicious code that has occurred in the years since the 
original study. As noted in the original Liang and Xue (2010) article, the concept of spyware was relatively 
new and poorly understood at the time of their study. Malware of all types has grown substantially more 
pervasive and users have gained a much greater sense of their overall vulnerability to malevolent attacks. 
Thus it is likely that perceptions of general susceptibility to malware and/or spyware have increased over 
time, to the point where susceptibility is almost a given. This may lead respondents to place more emphasis 
on perceived severity when evaluating their overall perception of the threat in the current operating 
environment. We note that perceived severity was a stronger predictor of perceived threat in our study as 
compared to the original findings. Despite the divergent nature of these findings, the combined power of 
perceived severity and perceived susceptibility to predict perceived threat was relatively equal in both 
studies. A second notable difference in our findings was that perceived threat was, at best, a modestly 
significant predictor of avoidance motivation in our study, while this relationship was highly significant in the 
Liang and Xue (2010) study. Conversely, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy were 
all stronger predictors of avoidance motivation in our study, but the total percentage of avoidance motivation 
predicted was somewhat lower. Even though our ability to predict avoidance motivation was somewhat 
lower than the original study, we ultimately accounted for a substantially larger percentage of the variance 
in avoidance behavior. This phenomenon is more fully discussed under the directions for future research 
below. 
Another interesting point of discussion was our consistent finding regarding the lack of a significant 
interaction effect between perceived severity and perceived susceptibility. While Liang and Xue (2009) 
provide a well-reasoned theoretical basis for expecting this interaction effect, it was not significant in the 
original study nor in our replication. One potential explanation for these findings may be underlying 
differences in threat perceptions between the technology threat domain and the referent domains which 
serve as the theoretical basis for this hypothesized interaction. In the organizational risk analysis domain, 
susceptibility to a threat is based on actuarial or quasi-actuarial projections, while the cost of damage is 
often based on previous event data. Similarly, in the healthcare domain, susceptibility is estimated based 
on known correlated factors such as lifestyle choices, proximity to risk vectors, and presence of related 
disease while perceived severity is based on previous patient data. In the technology threat domain, both 
perceived susceptibility estimates and perceived severity estimates are less likely to be based on historical 
data and much more likely to be influenced by emotion and socially derived perceptions. Quite simply, the 
types of highly structured and robust analytical processes that inform the organizational risk analysis and 
healthcare risk domains are less likely to be present when individual IT users are making a technology threat 
assessment. As carefully noted in Liang and Xue’s (2009) original conceptual development, different 
individuals perceive the same threat differently in terms of both severity and susceptibility due to subjective 
personal frames of reference. Thus, we contend that any observed significant interaction between perceived 
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susceptibility and perceived severity in the personal technology threat domain is potentially a spurious 
finding in the absence of consistent data that drives those user perceptions.  
6 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
An important limitation of our research is the use of university students as subjects in a manner similar to 
the original Liang and Xue (2010) study. Although a strong case can be made that university students are 
an appropriate subject pool for examining the phenomena of interest, care should be exercised in 
generalizing the results to other groups of computer users. We have carefully considered a variety of 
recommendations regarding generalizations using student samples (Compeau et al., 2012) and feel that 
the findings presented here can be reasonably construed to apply to a more general population of 
technology users. The university students used in our sample are, in fact, a key component of the broader 
technology user population. Although they tend to be younger, more frequent technology users, and more 
technology savvy than the population as a whole, they appear particularly well positioned to provide insights 
on technology threat avoidance behavior. They are similar to the general population in terms of using 
technology for a myriad of purposes, having to assess potential threats to their technology usage, and 
having to make assumptions about the cost and efficacy of protective measures. Thus, they are well-
positioned to provide opinions representative of the broader population.  
Another potential limitation of our study is that, in the course of our replication, we noted some potentially 
problematic items and scale anchors in the Liang and Xue (2010) instrument. We modified the scale anchors 
in our study but resisted substantially modifying the item wording as we felt it would have a negative impact 
on the replication quality. This brings us to our first suggestion for future research.  
The Liang and Xue (2010) instrument presents several opportunities for improvement through item revisions 
and improved scale anchors. Liang and Xue (2010) incorporated several pre-existing scales from other 
domains. Some of these scales were originally semantic differential scales that were converted to Likert 
scales but the semantic differential anchors were retained. Consider the following example item: “Spyware 
would invade my privacy” where subjects were asked to rate perceived severity on a scale with anchors of 
1=innocuous and 7=extremely devastating. It is apparent that revised anchors such as 1=strongly disagree 
and 7=strongly agree would present a clearer logical choice to the respondent. Additionally, several 
individual items on the original Liang and Xue (2010) instrument incorporate multiple disparate constructs, 
thus making the meaning of the respondent’s answer unclear. Consider the following item: “I don’t have 
anti-spyware on my PC because I don’t know how to get an anti-spyware software”. A respondent may 
interpret this item several ways such as “Strongly Disagree – I don’t have it because it costs too much (rather 
than I don’t know how to get it)” or “Strongly Disagree – I do have anti-spyware on my system”. We believe 
a more robust and potentially more parsimonious instrument can be derived through careful item 
examination and additional instrument validation measures. In terms of parsimony, we believe most scales 
in the instrument can be reduced to approximately four item scales without substantial loss of reliability and 
such an improvement would significantly enhance the utility of the instrument. Therefore we believe any 
future research considering Technology Threat Avoidance Theory should incorporate efforts to improve 
these scale weaknesses. 
A second direction for future research arises from our finding that the model’s ability to predict avoidance 
behavior was better than its ability to predict avoidance motivation in the replication effort. Since motivation 
is often characterized as a direct antecedent of behavior, this finding suggests that some significant 
predictors of motivation are missing from the model. We urge future research that evaluates the impact of 
additional constructs supported as predictors of motivation in other cyber security contexts such as risk 
propensity (Chen, Wang, Herath, & Rao, 2011; Chung & Galletta, 2013) distrust, (Ho & Chau, 2013; Westin, 
2003) and impulse control (Hu, West, & Smarandescu, 2015; Li, Sarathy, Zhang, & Luo, 2014). 
Another potential research opportunity related to TTAT is the influence of risk tolerance and social factors.  
Works in this area would support Liang and Xue’s (2009) conceptualization of risk tolerance impacting an 
individual’s threat appraisal which remains untested.  Liang and Xue (2009) also suggested a general 
relationship between social factors and the TTAT model.  One research opportunity would be to determine 
whether social influences relate to an individual’s threat appraisal, coping appraisal or coping.  In addition, 
future researchers should consider which social influences are important – information influences or 
normative influences. Liang and Xue (2009) believe that informational influence is medicated by threat and 
coping appraisals and that normative social influence may have a direct effect.  Both theoretical influences 
remain untested with one notable exception.  Lai et al. (2012) looked at social influence as an antecedent 
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to technological coping.  Future research should begin to examine which social influences might impact 
technology threat avoidance. 
7 Conclusions 
Our study largely validates the usefulness and efficacy of the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory model 
through a conceptual replication examining predictors of avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior. The 
slight contextual change in the extant study, coupled with changes in the technology threat environment 
over time, highlight opportunities for continued refinements to the theoretical underpinnings of the model. 
While our research shows that safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy are relatively 
robust predictors of avoidance motivation across varied settings, the impact of perceived threat (including 
its perceived susceptibility antecedent) may be less stable under changing contextual/environmental 
circumstances. 
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Appendix A: Indicators and Text 



















 SUS1 It is extremely likely that my computer will 
contain malware in the future. 
It is extremely likely that my computer will 
be infected by spyware in the future. 
SUS2 The chances of getting malware on my 
system are great. 
My chances of getting spyware are great.   
SUS3 There is a good possibility that my 
computer will contain malware at some 
point. 
There is a good possibility that my 
computer will have spyware.   
SUS4 There is a good chance that there will be 
malware on my computer at some point in 
the future. 
It is extremely likely that spyware will infect 
my computer  
















SEV1 Malware could steal personal information 
from my computer without my knowledge. 
Spyware would steal personal information 
from my computer without my knowledge 
SEV2 Malware could invade my privacy. Spyware would  invade my privacy 
SEV3 My personal information collected by 
malware could be misused by cyber 
criminals. 
My personal information collected by 
spyware would be misused by cyber 
criminals. 
SEV4 Malware could record my Internet activities 
and send it to unknown parties. 
Spyware could record my Internet 
activities and send it to unknown parties. 
SEV5 My personal information collected by 
malware could be subjected to 
unauthorized secondary use. 
My personal information collected by 
spyware could be subjected to 
unauthorized secondary use. 
SEV6 My personal information collected by 
malware could be used to commit crimes 
against me. 
My personal information collected by 
spyware could be used to commit crimes 
against me. 
SEV7 1  Malware could slow down my Internet 
connection. 
Spyware would slow down my Internet 
connection. 
SEV8 Malware could make my computer run 
more slowly. 
Spyware would make my computer run 
more slowly. 
SEV9 Malware could cause my systems to crash 
from time to time. 
Spyware would cause my systems to 
crash from time to time. 
SEV10 Malware could affect some of my computer 
programs and make them difficult to use. 
Spyware would affect some of my 
computer programs and make them 












t THR1 Malware poses a threat to me. Spyware poses a threat to me. 
THR2 The consequences of getting malware on 
my computer threaten me. 
The trouble cause by spyware threatens 
me.   
THR3 Malware is a danger to my computer. Spyware is a danger to my computer. 
THR4 It would be dreadful if my computer was 
infected by malware. 
It is dreadful if my computer is infected by 
spyware.   
THR5 It would be risky to use my computer if it 
had malware. 
It is risky to use my computer if it has 



















 EFF1 Computer security software would be 
useful for detecting and removing malware. 
Anti-spyware software would be useful for 
detecting and removing spyware.   
EFF2 Computer security software would 
increase my ability to protect my computer 
from malware. 
Anti-spyware software would increase my 
performance in protecting my computer 
from spyware. 
EFF3 Computer security software would enable 
me to search and remove malware on my 
computer faster. 
Anti-spyware software would enable me 
to search and remove malware on my 
computer faster. 
EFF4 Computer security software would 
enhance my effectiveness in finding and 
removing malware on my computer. 
Anti-spyware software would enhance my 
effectiveness in finding and removing 
malware on my computer. 
                                                     
1 Indicator not included in data analysis due to poor loading on focal construct 
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EFF5 Computer security software would make it 
easier to search for and removed malware 
on my computer. 
Anti-spyware software would make it 
easier to search for and removed malware 
on my computer. 
EFF6 Computer security software would 
increase my productivity in searching and 
removing malware on my computer. 
Anti-spyware software would increase my 
productivity in searching and removing 












CST1 I don't have security software on my 
computer because I don't know how to get 
it. 
I don't have anti-spyware software on my 
computer because I don't know how to get 
an anti-spyware software. 
CST2 I don't have security software on my 
computer because it may cause problems 
with other programs on my computer 
I don't have anti-spyware software on my 
computer because anti-spyware software 
may cause problems to other programs on 
my computer 
CST3 I don't have security software on my 
computer because installing it is too much 
trouble. 
I don't have anti-spyware software on my 
computer because installing anti-spyware 











SLF1  I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....There was 
no one around to tell me what to do. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....There was no one 
around to tell me what to do. 
SLF2  I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I had never 
used a package like it before. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I had never used a 
package like it before. 
SLF3  I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I only had 
the software manuals for reference. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I only had the 
software manuals for reference. 
SLF4 I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I had seen 
someone else do it before trying myself. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I had seen someone 
else do it before trying myself. 
SLF5 I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I could call 
someone for help if I got stuck. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I could call someone 
for help if I got stuck. 
SLF6 I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....Someone 
helped me get started. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....Someone else 
helped me get started. 
SLF7 I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I had a lot 
of time to complete the task. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I had a lot of time to 
complete the job. 
SLF8  I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I only had 
the built-in help facility for assistance. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I had just the built-
in help facility for assistance. 
SLF9 I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....Someone 
showed me how to do it first. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....Someone showed 
me how to do it first. 
SLF10 I could successfully install and use 
computer security software if....I had used 
a similar package before. 
I could successfully install and use anti-
spyware software if....I had used similar 


















 MOT1 I intend to use computer security software 
to avoid malware breaches. 
I intend to use anti-spyware software to 
avoid spyware.   
MOT2 I use computer security software to avoid 
malware breaches. 
I plan to use anti-spyware software to 
avoid spyware.   
MOT3 I plan to use computer security software to 
avoid malware. 
I predict I would use anti-spyware software 
















r BEH1 I run computer security software regularly 
to remove malware from my computer. 
I run anti-spyware software regularly to 
remove spyware from my computer.   
BEH2 I update my computer security software 
regularly. 
I update my anti-spyware software 
regularly.   
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Appendix B: Factor Loadings 
Indicators Mean S.D. SEV SUS THR EFF COS SLF MOT BEH 
SEV1 5.73 1.348  0.85 0.33 0.52  0.47 -0.15  0.29  0.30  0.21 
SEV2 5.88 1.272   0.88 0.31 0.58  0.55 -0.15  0.31  0.34  0.22 
SEV3 5.74 1.275  0.84 0.30 0.53  0.50 -0.16  0.30  0.34  0.26 
SEV4 5.69 1.345  0.80 0.32 0.49  0.49 -0.17  0.24  0.30  0.26 
SEV5 5.71 1.327  0.87 0.33 0.50  0.50 -0.21  0.32  0.31  0.23 
SEV6 5.40 1.466  0.71 0.31 0.46  0.39 -0.09  0.21  0.25  0.20 
SEV8 5.87 1.255  0.81 0.31 0.46  0.48 -0.16  0.20  0.27  0.16 
SEV9 5.61 1.304  0.78 0.35 0.49  0.45 -0.14  0.20  0.28  0.20 
SEV10 5.71 1.297  0.78 0.29 0.48  0.46 -0.23  0.27  0.35  0.23 
SUS1 4.59 1.561  0.24 0.84 0.18  0.10  0.13  0.09  0.06  0.00 
SUS2 4.37 1.609  0.25 0.77 0.21  0.14  0.13  0.10  0.10  0.01 
SUS3 5.07 1.502  0.39 0.86 0.24  0.20  0.03  0.13  0.11  0.02 
SUS4 4.99 1.473  0.39 0.88 0.30  0.18  0.08  0.13  0.13  0.04 
THR1 5.26 1.395  0.47 0.35 0.81  0.52 -0.02  0.19  0.26  0.19 
THR2 5.28 1.325  0.43 0.21 0.80  0.50  0.04  0.19  0.26  0.18 
THR3 5.69 1.300  0.56 0.24 0.78  0.52 -0.11  0.28  0.36  0.18 
THR4 5.70 1.380  0.43 0.17 0.72  0.54 -0.10  0.16  0.28  0.19 
THR5 5.49 1.334  0.49 0.10 0.77  0.50 -0.08  0.20  0.27  0.22 
EFF1 5.66 1.172  0.50 0.14 0.30  0.84 -0.22  0.24  0.39  0.28 
EFF2 5.74 1.222  0.48 0.13 0.29  0.81 -0.19  0.27  0.41  0.25 
EFF3 5.52 1.226  0.49 0.17 0.32  0.83 -0.16  0.29  0.38  0.33 
EFF4 5.61 1.201  0.50 0.19 0.34  0.85 -0.16  0.33  0.42  0.32 
EFF5 5.60 1.203  0.48 0.15 0.29  0.84 -0.17  0.31  0.43  0.32 
EFF6 5.54 1.221  0.49 0.18 0.33  0.85 -0.15  0.24  0.45  0.36 
COS1 3.11 1.915 -0.17 0.11 0.01 -0.15  0.90 -0.04 -0.33 -0.28 
COS2 3.06 1.806 -0.18 0.06 0.04 -0.22  0.87 -0.05 -0.31 -0.22 
COS3 3.15 1.891 -0.19 0.10 0.00 -0.18  0.92 -0.06 -0.38 -0.33 
SLF4 5.06 1.578 0.25 0.12 0.19 0.24 -0.05  0.84  0.22  0.19 
SLF5 5.34 1.478 0.30 0.09 0.23 0.28 -0.08  0.80  0.27  0.17 
SLF6 5.24 1.588 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.24  0.03  0.81  0.15  0.08 
SLF7 5.14 1.507 0.21 0.06 0.20 0.21  0.04  0.70  0.11  0.10 
SLF9 5.25 1.677 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.19 -0.01  0.77  0.11  0.06 
SLF10 5.16 1.466 0.24 0.06 0.21 0.34 -0.11  0.75  0.22  0.21 
MOT1 5.42 1.438 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.47 -0.36  0.26  0.93  0.66 
MOT2 5.17 1.655 0.33 0.09 0.31 0.41 -0.39  0.19  0.89  0.77 
MOT3 5.47 1.425 0.37 0.13 0.37 0.49 -0.30  0.25  0.93  0.64 
BEH1 4.73 1.774 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.37 -0.29  0.15  0.73  0.94 
BEH2 4.88 1.732 0.26 0.02 0.22 0.32 -0.29  0.21  0.67  0.93 
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